Th e present article surveys some relevant developments of conceptualizations of hell in the Ṛ g-Veda, the Avestan corpus and the Middle Persian (Pahlavi) literature of the Zoroastrians, where hell is more extensively discussed. Th e article concludes by looking at the belief in heaven and hell among the world-wide Zoroastrian diaspora communities, urban laity in Mumbai, and professional priests in Westen India.
. . . a-dānīh . . . čiyōn mahist parwānag ī ō dušox . . . ignorance . . . which (is) the greatest guide to hell (Zādspram 30:38) In his groundbreaking work La philosophie de l'histoire from 1765 the French enlightenment philosopher Voltaire challenged some main paradigms of established European historiography. Based on the idea of the principal unity and continuity of mankind, Voltaire replaced the idea of salvation history conceived as a pyramid with Judaeo-Christianity as the top with a more open structure, in which other cultures are assigned signifi cant places. Th eir contributions to the civilization of mankind are sometimes emphasized as part of Voltaire's campaign against the church and other manifestations of l'infâme. For example, Voltaire claims that fundamental aspects of unspoiled religion had originated in the East a long time before they became part of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Zoroastrianism is an important case in point. Having read a Persian Zoroastrian text in Latin translation (published in 1700), Voltaire writes:
. . . ces Parsis croyaient depuis longtemps un dieu, un diable, une résurrection, un paradis, un enfer. Ils sont les premiers, sans contredit, qui ont établi ces idées . . . (Voltaire 1969:127) Th us, Voltaire claims that fundamental ideas such as god, devil, resurrection, paradise, and hell, which constitute something like the doctrinal kernel of Christianity, did in fact originate with Zoroastrianism.
1 Th e presumed impact of Zoroastrian theological ideas such as monotheism, dualism, angels, demons, eschatology, paradise, apocalypticism, and pollution on the Judaic-Christian traditions have been an important stimulus triggering the academic interest in Zoroastrianism. Nowadays, such claims abound in cyberspace, often based on older scholarly literature. Th e Oxford Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, Robert Charles Zaehner (1913 Zaehner ( -1974 , for example, writing in 1961, fi nds that "the similarities are so great and the historical context so neatly apposite that it would be carrying scepticism altogether too far to refuse to draw the obvious conclusion " (1961:57) , namely that Christian concepts of rewards and punishment, heaven and hell, are dependent on Zoroastrian ideas. In his posthumously published work Lux perpetua, the Belgian historian of ancient religions Franz Cumont (1868 -1947 pointed to what he considered to be quite pervasive Zoroastrian infl uences, mediated by the "Magians" of Western Asia, 2 on the transformation of the Greek concept of Hades (Cumont 1949:219-234) . Among his strongest points of evidence he pointed to the role of demons as punishers in hell (which we will encounter below) and the idea of punishment by means of fi re (which we, contrary to widely shared misconceptions do not fi nd in Zoroastrian sources). 3 In the present article, we will not discuss these theories or reconstructions. One of their inherent problems is that they often tend to stipulate a consistent Iranian or Zoroastrian framework. In the present article we will, on the contrary, try to historicize Zoroastrian conceptions 1) See Stausberg 1998 :901-46 for Voltaire's views on Zoroaster.
2) Most contemporary scholars no longer believe in the existence of this group (see Beck 1991; de Jong 1997) .
3) Against (among others) Cumont, Tardieu (1985) points to Greek, Christian and other traces in one important Zoroastrian Middle Persian text, the Ardā Vīrāz Nāmag, which he regards as a storage basin of various religious ideas and traditions, enriched by some elements of Iranian provenience.
of hell by outlining their development through some major stages of Zoroastrian history.
I. Origins and Early Developments
Mary Boyce (1920 Boyce ( -2006 , the doyenne of Zoroastrian studies in the late 20th century, has voiced the opinion that Zoroaster was the fi rst to develop a clear conception of an underworld "not merely of negations, but of punishment, in fact as hell" (1996[1975]:84) . Th e daēuuas, the "debased" deities of the presumed pre-Zoroastrian "pagan" religion, became its principal "inhabitants, to be execrated by all true followers of the prophet" (ibid.).
Linear developments such as these, where a pre-Zoroastrian religion assumed to have been "reformed" by the "prophet" is reconstructed mainly on the basis of comparative Indo-Iranian philology, are problematic in theoretical and methodological respects (see e.g. Stausberg 2002a:115-17) . A claim such as the one advanced by Boyce would be plausible only if it could be shown that there are no traces of hell-like conceptions in the Vedic, more precisely the early Vedic (= Ṛ gvedic) hymns, the closest linguistic, poetic and to some (unclear) extent also historical cognates of the textual corpus known as the Avesta. Further evidence would then be necessary to substantiate such a claim.
Th e Ṛ g-Veda
Let us therefore start by looking at the early Vedic evidence. Scholars of Vedic religion, most extensively Hermann Oldenberg (1923:536-42) , have discussed some fi ve passages that could at fi rst sight appear to be relevant for a conceptualization of hell (RV II.29.6; VII.104; X.152.4) . Th ere is a consensus in scholarship that most of these passages, some of which allude to people falling or being thrown into a pit, cannot be taken as proof of the existence of a fully developed conceptualization of hell (see e.g. Witzel and Gotō 2007:462; Oberlies 1998:473) , especially in comparison with later developments in Indic religions (later Vedas, Buddhism, and Hinduism) .
Th e main positive reference is book VII, hymn 104, verse 3:
índrāsomā duṣ kṛ to vavre antaranārambhaṇ e támasi prá vidhyatam / yathā nātaḥ punarekaścanodayat tad vāmastu sahase manyumacchavaḥ
Indra and Soma, throw forth the evil-doers into the enclosure, into the anchorless darkness | So that not one may ever get out of there, so may your fi erce might prevail over them
It remains unclear (and also depends on one's concept of hell) whether the notion of an anchorless, dark enclosure into which evildoers are plunged by rightly wrathful deities can be meaningfully classifi ed as a hell. 4 Be that as it may, one needs to bear in mind that this last hymn of the seventh book appears to be an additional text, which, moreover, appears to have some unusual features. One is the use of the word támas-("darkness"), which according to Stephanie Jamison (1991:267 n.227 ) is used only twice in the RV outside the passages pertaining to the villain Svarbhānu. Th e other passage is RV I.182.6, which refers to a son of Tugra who had been cast down into the waters and was "thrown forth into the anchorless darkness." Note that the darkness is here too characterized as "anchorless" (anārambhané). Th ese are the only passages in the RV where the root √vyadh is used together with prá, yielding the literal meaning "to wound forth" (Jamison 1991:267 n.227 ). Th us, not only is the concept of a space vaguely reminiscent of a "hell" in RV VII.104.3 somewhat unique in the RV, but it is accompanied by unusual linguistic features which further indicate its marginal position. Th e verse describes an amorphous, dark place, which is located somewhere in the abyss below, some kind of enclosure (a dungeon or a pit) from which it seems impossible to escape, and into which evildoers are thrown so that the deities can torment them. Since this place has no proper name, it can be regarded as a hell avant le lettre.
Th e House of Lie in the Gāthās
Let us now turn to the Gāthās, presumably the earliest part of the Avestan corpus, often ascribed to its eponymous "founder," Zarathustra/Zoroaster (but see Stausberg 2007) . A linguistic observation seems as a reasonable 4) Among Vedic scholars, Witzel and Gotō (2007:462) reject this verse as evidence for the notion of hell, while Oldenberg (1923:538) on the contrary fi nds it diffi cult to dismiss it as evidence. starting point: the fact that təmah-, the Avestan equivalent to Vedic támas-("darkness"), used in the passage discussed above (RV VII.104.3) to qualify the hell-like place, is attested twice in the Gāthās.
In Yasna 44, from the second Gāthā, the poet, identifi ed by many as Zarathushtra, inquires of Ahura Mazdā which craftsman had fashioned the lights and the darkness (plural!) (Y. 44.5). In this context, the word does not appear to refer to a hell-like state. Th e second passage (Y. 31.20) is in the fi rst Gāthā. It is one of those verses where translators are hopelessly at variance with each other. Th ere is, however, a consensus that, in the second part, the executors of the Lie (drəguuaṇ tō), the deceitful ones, are threatened because of their own actions with an extended stay in darkness (singular!), foul nourishment (food and drink), and the word "woe." It seems that we are here encountering the notion of a separate space characterized by some extremely unpleasant features.
Foul nourishment (duš.x v arəϑa-) is also mentioned in a verse of the short last Gāthā (Y. 53.6). It again appears in the accusative singular, apparently as something that the deceitful ones off er. Unfortunately, this verse seems even more obscure than Y. 31.20.
5 Bad food (akāiš x v arəϑāiš), here used in an instrumental plural, is also a key ingredient of the next verse to be considered in this context. Th is verse (Y. 49.11) from the third Gāthā appears less ambiguous. Humbach translates as follows:
But the deceitful of bad rule, bad action, bad word, of bad religious view, (and) bad thought: (the) souls come to meet (them) with foul food 6 (and) they will be welcome guests in the house of deceit. (Humbach 1991:182 ; see also Humbach and Ichaporia 1994:91) Apparently, this verse speaks of the bad food that the souls (uruuanō = nominative plural) in an instrumental sense will present in the future to subjects whose achievements are bad. Th e verse continues by saying 5) See Kellens and Pirart (1991:270) : "Les diffi cultés métriques et lexicales se combinent pour rendre cette strophe presque entièrement incompréhensible." 6) Kellens and Pirart (1988:174) translate c as follows: "leur (propre) être leur fait tribu de mauvaises nourritures." that the souls will then be welcomed in the house of the Lie. Is that a proper noun for what may be classifi ed as "hell"?
Th e House of Lie (drūjō dəmāna-) is mentioned in two other verses in the Gāthās. In one verse from the third Gāthā (Y. 46.11), we fi nd it used in combination with the notion of the guest (asti-, Vedic átithi-). Th e verse in question is one of the prime examples of early Zoroastrian individual eschatology. In Humbach's translation it reads as follows:
Th rough (their) powers, the Karapans and Kavis yoke a mortal one together with evil actions in order to destroy (his) existence Th eir own soul and their own religious view will recoil from them when they will have reached the place of the account-keeper's bridge, 7 (and they will remain) for all time guests (attached) to the house of deceit. (Y. 46.11; Humbach1991:171 [see also Humbach and Ichaporia 1994:79]) Th e verse seems to be saying that the karapan and the kauui, the main categories of the religious adversaries of the in-group, are able to tie the mortals to bad actions so that, when they reach the point of decision over their future destiny, they will become guests of the house of deceit. While this house is not specifi ed, it is made clear that being a guest in that house is an irreversible state -one remains there yauuōi vīspāi, literally for "all life-times."
In a verse from the fourth Gāthā (Y. 51.14), the exact meaning of which is again rather obscure, the karapan themselves are singled out as ultimately ending up in the House of Lie. From the grammatical structure of the sentence it seems clear that it is because of their neglect of the orders of the Wise Lord and their dissociation from the Cow (and pasture), as well as because of their own acts and utterances, that they will reach the House of Lie (Y. 51.14). Th e following verse (Y. 51.15) shows that this House of Lie is constructed in correspondence with the House of Welcome (garō dəmānē), to which Ahura Mazdā goes fi rst (Y. 51.15b) . Th e verse also mentions the (eschatological) reward that Zarathushtra had assigned to the magauuan, 8 the positive antagonists 7) Th is is the cinuuaṇ t-pərəϑu-, a term which is variously interpreted and translated; see now Hintze (2000:258 n.39 ) who suggests the translation "Brücke des Büßers" ("bridge of the penitent"). What can we conclude from this admittedly brief analysis (one of the main weaknesses of which is that, for lack of space, it has to ignore the intra-textual contexts)? I think we can conclude that there is a pair of terms, the House of Welcome and the House of Lie respectively, which appear to be linked to the several protagonists of the unfolding confl ict between Ahura Mazdā and his supporter(s) on the one hand and the Lie (druj-) and the powers of evil on the other. Th us, "heaven" and "hell" are here in the process of emerging as conceptual labels, while the Ṛ gvedic texts have not taken that step. Contrary to the Vedic verse quoted above, where the deities are exhorted to throw the villains into an amorphous space, the materials from the Gāthā consistently make it a point that it is their actions and other deliberately caused states of those affi liated with the Lie or their neglect of Ahura Mazdā that cause them to end up there. Th e poet exhorts the Wise Lord to see to it that this mechanism is eff ectuated, but Ahura Mazdā is not himself exhorted to put the deceitful ones in the House of Lie. From one verse (Y. 46.11) it seems that the deceitful ones will remain in the House of Lie forever. Darkness is only indirectly mentioned as a feature, but bad nourishment/ food is a major characteristic. Th is can be linked to the concept of guesthood, for the guests in the House of Lie will enjoy a miserable form of hospitality. Moreover, contrary to the Vedic evidence, the House of Lie is clearly recognizable as an eschatological space.
Th ese conclusions might tempt one to nominate Zoroaster, the alleged composer of the Gāthās, as the inventor of hell (see Boyce above). Such a conclusion only seems warranted to the detriment of neglecting the later Indian developments. However, already in the later Vedas the notion of hell seems to be well attested (see Oldenberg 1923:537) . Th e assumption of a prophetic innovation or reform (which is something like a basic assumption of many reconstructions of early Zoroastrianism) is not a necessary precondition for the genesis of the conceptualizations of hell, nor does hell emerge only as a result of a dualistic cosmology. Instead of speculating on origins let us turn to later developments.
Terms for Hell or Hell-like States in the Younger/Standard Avesta
While we can observe the emergence, if not the full conceptual unfolding, of an explicit notion of a hell in the Gāthās, this "invention of hell" is not the point of departure for a direct line of development in the (supposedly) later textual traditions. For the neat pair of terms that we found in the Gāthās is not attested in the remaining, presumably later, Avestan corpus. Once, a "massive house of a deceitful one" (sūrəm nmānəm druuatō) is mentioned (Yt. 5.38), but the House of Lie is nowhere attested outside the Gāthās. However, the House of Welcome (in its Standard/Younger Avestan form as garō.nmāna-) is. 9 Apparently, it has remained a standard name for "paradise."
In general, the Avestan texts are not much concerned with "heaven" and "hell." Th ere are three closely interrelated terms referring to what we might call "hell" or "a hell-like state." None of them occurs frequently. One is aŋhu-/ahu-acišta-("the worst being/existence"). Th is form seems from the very term itself 10 to be built on inferences from the Gāthās. In the penultimate section of the Yasna, Ahura Mazdā exhorts Zarathustra to pronounce the words that he (= Ahura Mazdā) had revealed to him (= Zarathustra) at the "ultimate turning point of life" (ustəme uraaēse gaiiehe) so that (by pronouncing these words) his soul will be kept away at a given distance from "the worst being/existence" (Y. 71.15). Th e "worst existence" thus appears to be conceptualized in spatial and eschatological terms, that is, a place it is possible to reach, but from which one rather keeps a distance.
11 While the Yasna 9) Bartholomae (1979 Bartholomae ( [1904 :512-13) lists 8 occurrences of this word in the Standard/ Younger Avestan corpus. 10) Th e words aŋhuš acištō occur in conjunction in Y. 30.4 (b/c), but although both are in the nominative singular, recent translators such as Humbach and Kellens/Pirart, apparently for metrical reasons, separate the words in their translation. Th ey do not translate them as "the worst being/existence," but as "l'existence (de la) pire" (Kellens/ Pirart 1988:111) , making it appear as if acištō was a genitive, or they split the construction: ". . . and how his existence will be in the end. (Th e existence) of the deceitful will be very bad . . ." (Humbach/Ichaporia 1994:31) . 11) A Gāthic point of departure is Y. 51.6, which speaks of the "fi nal turning point of existence," apparently as a certain temporal moment, when the person who has failed to care for Ahura Mazdā will be assigned to "what is worse than bad," something like hell, whereas the person who has the right relationship to Ahura Mazdā obtains "what is better than good."
shows the recipient a way to avoid ending up in that place (by pronouncing the revealed words), the fi nal verse of the long fi fth chapter of the Vendidād threatens that one who disregards the laws of dealing with corpses will attain the existence of the executors of Lie (ahūm . . . druuantąm), the evildoers, an existence which is here qualifi ed as dark, consisting of darkness, 12 and emanating from darkness, and which is referred to, possibly as a gloss (Bartholomae 1979 (Bartholomae [1904 :109), as "the worst being/existence" (V. 5.62). Th e emphasis on darkness refers back to the Gāthās, and Y. 31.20c (mentioned above) is actually inserted into this verse. Here, however, the state of eschatological being is not clearly conceived in spatial metaphors.
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Th is verse is possibly copied from the fi nal verse of the eighteenth chapter of the Vendidād, which states, in the context of a discussion of possible means to expiate the transgression of having sexual intercourse with a menstruating woman, that if one applies a pain (punishment) one will attain "the existence/being of the executors of Truthfulness/ Righteousness" (ahūm . . . yim aṣ̌ aonąm), whereas those who do not will attain that of the "executors of Lie" (ahūm . . . yim druuantąm). Here we encounter a clear parallelism between the rewards of the good and evil people respectively. Th e term ahu . . . druuantąm ("existence of the executors of the Lie") denotes a hell-like state of eschatological existence without any clear spatial characteristics.
Th e third Standard/Young Avestan term denoting something like "hell," which also builds on the word aŋhu-/ahu-("being"; "existence"; "life"), but has no clear Gāthic antecedent, is daožaŋ v ha-, literally "[place of ] bad being/existence." In two places it has the epithet ərəγaṇ t-, likewise not attested in the Gāthās, meaning something like "tumul tuous" ( JamaspAsa /Humbach 1971:63; Hintze 1994a:233-34) , "uproarious," or "raging." Th is adjective is also used twice to characterize fl ies (V. 7.2; 14.6). In the fi nal verse of the 19th chapter of the Vendidād, after the demons have wondered how they might fi nish off Zarathustra, they recede to "the bottom of the dark being/existence, [to] the tumultuous hell" (V. 19.47). daožaŋ v ha-is here indexed as a spatial category, the 12) In Yt. 19.95 the Lie is qualifi ed with the same term (təmaŋhaēna-). 13) Bartholomae had understood the verbal form paϑiiāite to mean "hineingelangen" (obtain access to), which would suggest a spatial metaphor. Kellens (1984:20, n .1), however, has restored the reading to mean "disposer de" (possess).
habitat of the demons, characterized as deep and dark. In that sense it seems to correspond to a prototypical notion of hell (i.e. a familiar notion of hell primarily derived from the Christian tradition, then absorbed, enlarged and fi ne-tuned in scholarly contexts).
14 After V. 3 and 18, this is the third chapter of the Vendidād which concludes with a reference to hell or something similar. "Hell" seems to be a topos in the rhetoric of this text. Th e probably best known Avestan reference to "hell," however, occurs in a Yašt ("hymn"), in a passage that describes the fi ghts between the early heroes and their adversaries. According to this account, the great Avestan hero Kərəsāspa smashes an enemy with leaden jaws and hands of stones and who claims not yet to be of age. After coming of age, this Snāuuδika makes the following boast: What we learn from this proclamation of hubris is that the "tumultuous hell" is the residence of the Foul Spirit, that his residence is below and that the Foul Spirit may rush up from it for his destructive exploits.
To conclude our survey of the Avestan corpus, we need to look at the Hādōxt Nask, which is an account of what will happen to the soul of the deceased. Just as the soul of the executor of Truth/Righteousness, the soul of the executor of Lie takes four steps into the other world. It inhales a foul-smelling wind. Th e three fi rst steps are not described, but the fourth and fi nal one leads the soul of the deceiver into the Infi nite Darkness (plural!) (HN 2.33). Th is may vaguely remind us of the Gāthic passage referred to above (Y. 31.20) , where the word, however, appears in the singular. In any case, the composite anaγra-təmah-is a 14) Consulting main encyclopedias and dictionaries in religious studies, one fi nds astonishingly little conceptual eff ort spent on this term. For the purposes of this article, a discussion seems unnecessary. 15) For translations see Humbach/Ichaporia 1998:124; Hintze 1994a:232; Hintze 1994b:24; Skjaervø 2005:114. hapax in the Avestan texts, and it may well have been reconstructed in analogy to the anaγra-raocā, the Infi nite Lights which are attested in this as well as in some other Avestan texts.
II. Developments of Hell in Middle Persian (Pahlavi) Literature
When proceeding to the Zoroastrian writings in Middle Persian, the so-called Pahlavi-literature, we need to recall that we are crossing a period of at least a millennium, or even more likely a millennium and a half, which separates the Middle Persian from the Avestan texts. One starting point is to look at the Middle Persian translations of the Avestan texts.
Th e Middle Persian version of Hādōxt Nask 2.27-33 literally translates anaγra-raocā̊ as asar rōšnīg, the Infi nite Light. Th is compound remains a common term in the Pahlavi books as one of the names for heaven. Its opposite, asar tārīkīh, the Middle Persian form of anaγra-təmah-, does not seem to have become a common word. In the Pahlavi texts, hell is mostly known as dušox, the Middle Persian form of the Avestan daožaŋ v ha-.
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Compared to the Avestan corpus, there is an abundance of textual sources on hell in the Middle Persian theological literature. Th e present analysis cannot claim to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject. Before turning to main features of the perception, or construction, of hell in the Pahlavi books from the Islamic Middle Ages (9th century onwards), it is important to look at the fi rst clearly datable reference to hell.
Th e First Dated Occurrence: Kirdīr (3rd Century CE)
Th e fi rst dated references to "hell" are found in one of the four inscriptions that the high priest Kirdīr had carved in stone in the late third century ce. Among historians of religion, Kirdīr is maybe best known for his opposition to Mani and as partly responsible for the latter's execution. In his inscriptions -the only major inscriptions not carved by a king! -Kirdīr recounts his remarkable career and his achievements in propagating and restructuring the Zoroastrian religion (see e.g. Stausberg 2002a:222-26) . Interestingly, despite his wide-ranging 16) In the form dozaḥ this word continues in New Persian as the one word of Persian origin used for "hell." public claims, Kirdīr has been all but forgotten in the later Zoroastrian historical texts.
Two of Kirdīr's inscriptions, at Sar Mašhad and at Naqš-i Rustam, contain an account of a visit to the netherworld. In these accounts (which are preserved in a fragmentary state), the priest asks the gods to show him heaven and hell, and he is assured that their dēn ("religious consciousness") will lead (the souls of ) the saved ones to heaven and (the soul of ) the damned ones to hell. At the end, after his visit/vision, the priest proclaims that he has been reassured about the actual existence of heaven and hell (dwšḥ wy) ( § § 22 and 35-37 in the currently accepted reconstruction [see Gignoux 1991] ).
17 Th e inscriptions provide no details about hell. Probably as part of a discourse aiming at providing legitimacy to his extensive claims for religious authority, Kirdīr communicates his vision of the other world, with heaven or hell as the fi nal destinations of the (souls of the) departed.
Th e Knowledge of Hell and the Cognitive Evaluation of the Present Situation
Some Pahlavi writings regard heaven and hell as essential features of the Zoroastrian religion. One text, belonging to the genre of wisdomliterature, states, with reference to anonymous religious authorities of previous ages:
Th ey held this too: Every man's duty is to know these fi ve things; he who does not know them is under guilt. One is this: "What am I, a man or a demon?" One is this: "Where have I come from, from paradise or from hell?" One is this: "What do I stand by, by the things of the gods or by those of the demons?" One is this: "Whom do I follow, good people or wicked people?" One is this: "Where shall I go back, to paradise or to hell?" (Dk. VI 298 [= Shaked 1979:115]) Of course, all these questions have implications for the present. Heaven and hell, in particular, are basic points of cognitive reference for evaluating the present situation. One should always remember and fear hell:
17) Note that we are here dealing with a reconstruction. Th e word dwšḥ wy is materially attested in KNRm 64 and KNRb 5; the remaining instances (KSM 28/KNrm 53; KSM 29; KSM 52) are emendations.
Th ey held this too: Each man . . . should hold the things of the spirit in memory at every moment and time -both the goodness of paradise and the evil of hell. At a moment when comfort, good things and joy have accrued to him, he should think this: "It will indeed be good there in paradise, when even here it is so good. . . ." At a period when distress, grief, evil and pain have accrued to him, he should think this: "It will indeed be bad there in hell when it is so bad even here; when from the great goodness of Ohrmazd, with which there is no evil intermixed over there, it is (still) so bad here." (Dk. VI 16 [= Shaked 1979:9]) Unlike the protological past and the eschatological end, the present situation is characterized by a mixture of the divine and the demonic, the pure and the impure, good and evil, joy and sorrow, peace and war. Focusing on paradise is an imaginary strategy aiming at a conscious cognitive un-mixing of the present, by extracting from the present mixture that which is good only. For hell, there is the inverse strategy: even the worst things one has to endure in this life pale in comparison to the un-mixed suff ering one has to endure there.
Manuščihr, a ninth-century priest, explains that hell is so terrible precisely because evil there appears in such an un-mixed, that is, unmitigated, form that it has hardly any similarity with this world (Dd. 26.5 [= Jaafari-Dehaghi 1998:86-87]).
Anticipating Hell
Dēnkard VI narrates the story of two priests (ērbad) who carried fi rewood from a mountain on their backs. Th ey were quite exhausted. Asked by a high-priest why they were doing that sort of work, they replied that they had heard that everybody had to undergo some discomfort created by Ahreman, either in this world, the visible/material existence, or in the other world, the invisible/conceptual/spiritual existence. So they preferred to experience their share of discomfort in this world, where they would still see the sun and the moon and obtain nourishment, medicine, and remedies, because the discomfort one had to suff er in the invisible world would be without the addition of any good thing (Dk. VI D 5 [ = Shaked 1979:181-83] ). Experiencing the hell-like qualities of this world is preferable to having the full share of it in the other world. Th is account seems to imply that the experience of hell, or hell-like experiences, cannot be avoided, but that suff ering in this world can be tolerated since it is mitigated by the presence of some good elements. In line with this approach, another passage from Dēnkard VI praises the man who, as far as possible, endures hell in the visible/material world (dušox pad gētīg be barēd) (Dk. VI 305 [= Shaked 1979:121] ).
Accordingly, as Manuščihr argues, there is an inverse relationship between the troubles suff ered by the good people in this world and the joy they experience in the other world, to such an extent that "fear of the pain and punishment of hell" actually makes people refrain from pleasures in this world and makes them more virtuous (Dd. 5.5 [= Jaafari-Dehaghi 1998:52-53]). Manuščihr also points to diffi culties in cognitively anticipating the reality of hell. For according to him hell is diff erent from other things since in the case of hell the real thing is worse than what one fears it might be, whereas "the fear of every other thing is more than the thing itself " (Dd. 26,8 [= JaafariDehaghi 1998:88-89] ). Another Pahlavi text names the lack of "fear of hell" (bīm az dušox) as a sign of the catastrophic state of things at the end of the millennium (ZWY 4.40 [= Cereti 1995:138, 155] ).
While these texts recommend the fear of hell as an attitude towards this world, this position was not unanimously shared. Th ere is one text which explicitly advises that one should not focus one's thoughts strongly on hell since there is expiation for every sin in the Zoroastrian religion.
18 One should not consider anybody as "without hope of heaven" (ŠnŠ 12.28 [= Kotwal 1969:36-37] ).
Strategies of Hell-Avoidance
In line with the strategy of exposing oneself to hell-like experiences in order to avoid hell and the emphasis on the positive, but diffi cult task of fearing hell, several writings advise their readers to actively take precautions so as not to end up in hell. Th is is indicated by the expression not to "reject the soul," or, in positive terms, to do things "for the sake of the soul" (see Shaked 1990) .
In the Pahlavi translation of an Avestan text one fi nds the gloss that there are things that "save one's soul from hell" (ruwān az dušox . . . bōxtan) (Ner. II 66.4 [= Kotwal and Kreyenbroek 2003:280-81] least according to the priestly point of view mirrored in this text, this must be the main preoccupation of the faithful.
Apart from doing good things and avoiding evil ones, another strategy was to do repentance:
Th ey held this too: From repentance there is no way to hell. (Dk. VI 50 [= Shaked 1979:19] ). Accordingly, the long formulaic texts of repentance, the so-called Patīt, which are recited in ritual contexts, invariably contain the performative statement that repentance has been spoken by the believer either "from the great dread of hell" (PP I and II 12.3 [= Dhabhar 1963:120, 147]) or for "shutting the way to hell and for opening the way to paradise" (XP 13 [= Dhabhar 1963:156] ). Only by submitting his body and his possessions to the chiefs, by repenting mentally and by the chiefs absolving him, will the one who has committed deadly sins (marg-ar zān) be saved from hell (ŠnŠ 8.5 [Tavadia 1930:105-6] ). If no repentance is made, the sinner will unavoidably go to hell (ŠnŠ 8.7 [Tavadia 1930:106]) .
Th e main concern of the Zoroastrian texts is of course that Zoroastrians should be saved from hell. Th is, however, does not automatically imply that all non-Zoroastrians invariably end up in hell. A ritualistic treatise quotes one authority as having stated that a non-Zoroastrian (ag-dēn, literally "of evil religion") saves himself from hell if he does merely one good deed more than bad ones (ŠnŠ 6.5 [Tavadia 1930:97] ).
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Th e easiest way to avoid hell, of course, is to accumulate more good thoughts, words or deeds than bad. Some virtues, however, are praised as particularly effi cient to avoid hell. 20 A catechism highlights gratefulness (ČHP 30 [= Kanga 1960:16-17] ). Th is virtue is also praised in the wisdom literature as a way to save one's soul (Dk. VI 120; E38c; E45f [= Shaked 1979:48-49; 206-7; 214-15] ), sometimes in conjunction with other virtues such as contentment and tenderness. Generosity is also 19) Since this opinion is presented as that of one authority (whose name is given), one might surmise that it was not generally shared. 20) Likewise there are some sins that immediately lead to hell, such as performing worship while thinking that the gods do not exist (Dk. VI D1b [= Shaked 1979:176-77 Th e Pahlavi Rivayāt Accompanying the Dādestān ī Dēnīg, probably from the late 9th or early 10th century, emphasizes the practice of nextof-kin marriage (xwēdōdah) as a way to salvation (or rescue) from hell (bōxtišn az dušox), even in case of the most grievous sins (PRDd. 8b1 [= Williams 1990:11]) . Th e practice of next-of-kin marriage rescues one from hell, which is referred to as "the prison of Ahreman and the demons" (PRDd. 8b3 [= Williams 1990:11]) . Th e emphasis on the "miraculous" character of this practice possibly correlates with diffi culties in implementing the practice.
Th e Temporal Limitations of Hell
In the Gāthās we have seen that the "souls" and "religious views" of the condemned remain in the House of Lie "for all times" (Y. 46.11; see I.2. above). Th e Pahlavi sources, however, consistently emphasize that hell will be destroyed during the eschatological transfi guration of the world, which implies that the souls of the sinners will be released from hell at that time (see e.g. Dd. 31.8; 40.4; Dk. IX 17.6) . 21 Even the inhabitants of hell are aware of the fact that their suff ering will end after 9,000 years at the latest, although they hardly derive any consolation from that knowledge in their present tribulations (AVN 54.6).
At the end of time, however, after the general resurrection but before Ahreman and the demons are conquered and hell is abolished, mankind will again be reckoned, and, much to the dismay of their friends and family, all sinners (who lament to their relatives that they should have warned them about the terrible fate they are now suff ering) 22 will be forcefully put back into hell for a period of renewed suff ering lasting three nights (Bd. 34. According to the Bundahišn (Foundational Creation), the Fire (here apparently understood as a divine agent), together with Ērman, will melt the metals in the hills and mountains, causing them to fl ow over the earth like a river. All have to pass through this stream of molten metal, and thus they will be purifi ed, but while this is a pleasant experience for the righteous, for the sinners it will be exactly like walking through molten metal . 25 Th is collective purifi cation is followed by a state of mutual love and friendship (Bd. 34.20) .
According to another source, the Dēnkard, this fi nal purifi cation is part of the suff ering which the souls undergo in hell. As a result they will be purifi ed from their contamination of sin and will be "again clothed in a garment of the same substance, and they enjoy perfect bliss eternally and without interruption" (Dk. III 272 [= Zaehner 1972:262; see de Menasce 1973:273] ). Th e high-priest Manuščihr says that they become "righteous, pain-free, immortal, fearless, and free from evil" (Dd. 31.11 [= Jaafari-Dehaghi 1998:102-3] ).
According to the Bundahišn, at the eschatological transfi guration of the world, not only will the sinners be purifi ed and released, 26 but hell itself will be purifi ed by the stream of molten metal, and its stench and fi lth will be burnt by the molten metal (not directly by the fi re!) and then it will become clean (Bd. 34.31). Th e part of the world where hell was located will then be joined with the remaining extension of the world (Bd. 34.32). Th ese statements lead us to the question of the topography of hell.
branch or the root to the righteous and the sinners. In this way the two groups are separated (WZ 35.40) . Note that the fi re is here a divine actor carrying the trunk and lightening up the scene. It should not be confused with a cosmic fi re. 24) WZ 30.51 in passing uses the metaphor of prison for hell.
24)
25) Note that this does not amount to a cosmic fi re; the Fire is merely required to melt the metal (which is the purifying agent here). 26) Zaehner 1976:132 argues that this aspect of hell makes it similar to a purgatory.
Th e Topography and Ecology of Hell
Since the avoidance of hell was recommended as a constant mental preoccupation, it is only natural that the question arose as to what hell might be like. After all, if one is required to have something permanently on one's mind, one needs to have some idea of what it is.
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In the late 9th century, questions about the nature of hell, its punishments, pain and discomforts, as well as the food served there, were apparently posed to the high-priest Manuščihr and he replied to them in his book Religious Judgements (Dādestān ī dēnīg) (Dd.). Here is a brief summary of the information provided by Manuščihr, synoptically collated with and supplemented by information provided by some other texts such as the "anthology" of Manuščihr's brother Zādspram
(Wizīdagīhā ī Zādspram) (WZ), the Ardā Virāz Nāmag (Book of the Righteous Virāz) (AVN), the Dādestān ī mēnōg ī xrad (Judgements of the Spirit of Wisdom) (MX), the Zand ī Wahman Yasn (ZWY)
, the fi fth book of the Dēnkard (Dk.), and the Bundahišn (Foundational Creation) (Bd.). Most descriptors (i.e. terms describing the location) of hell hyperbolize in the extreme negative aspects of ordinary life.
28 Some descriptors appear predictable in theological, classifi catory and cognitive terms. Th e extreme phenomena are all a means to express the supposed suff ering of the souls of the sinners.
To begin with, Manuščihr provides the following concise description: "it is below, deep, and underground, most dark, most fetid, and most terrible, most unwanted, and worst, the place and the dwelling of demons and she-demons" (Dd. 26.2 [= Jaafari-Dehaghi 1998:86-87]). 29 Hell is fi lthy (Dd. 26.4; MX 1.119). 30 Apart from demons and 27) Th e available information is also summarized (but organized diff erently) in the entries "Dūzak" (M. Shaki) and "Hell. I. In Zoroastrianism" (Ph. Gignoux) in the Encyclopaedia Iranica (available online at www.iranica.com); see also Gignoux 1968. 28) Th e descriptors are therefore not counter-intuitive in the sense of the term established by cognitive approaches to the study of religion (i.e. as violating ontological categories). 29) Among the many demons inhabiting hell, slander (spazgīh) is unique: it is such a grievous sin that the slander-demon moves backward, while all other move forward (MX 2.8-12). 30) From a Douglasian point of view this is to be expected, for dirt is matter out of place, and hell is a place where the divine order is absent.
she-demons, hell is also the abode of sorcerers and witches (WZ 7.28; ZWY 3.27). It also houses the noxious animals (xrafstar), creatures of Ahreman; in hell even small noxious animals appear big as mountains (AVN 18.8).
Hell is regarded as Ahreman's residence or prison (ZWY 3.23; Bd. 4.27; Bd. 6j.0; PRDd. 8b3). In illo tempore Ahreman had pierced a hole into the good creation, and hell is located at the spot, in the middle of the earth, where the Foul Spirit had pierced the earth "like a snake coming out of its hole" (WZ 2.5; Bd. 4.28). Ahreman and the demons strive to escape hell in order to create chaos in the world, but they are sometimes cast back into hell -as after the appearance of Zarathustra on the cosmic scene (WZ 10.19), or by performing certain rituals (Dk. IX 14.2: the demons rush forward from hell in order to cause destruction, but by performing the drōn they are pushed back [see West 1892:197] ).
Th e topography of hell is not entirely consistent. It may be located in the middle of the earth as well in the north (Dd. 31.6), the direction of Ahreman and all evil agents.
Hell is either icy or terribly hot (MX 6.27) . Th e Bundahišn explains both phenomena by the connection of hell to the planets (Bd. 26.54).
Hell [Skjaervø 2005:203] ), Manuščihr provides a somewhat diff erent account: once fallen down, the soul is "oppressively fettered" and conducted to hell by a demon (Dd. 31.3 [= JaafariDehaghi 1998:98-99]). Th e Dādestān ī mēnōg ī xrad presents yet another account: here the demon already fetters the soul beforehand in order to make it proceed to the bridge, and then, maltreating it and ignoring its suff ering, crying, and pleading, eventually drags it down into hell (MX 1.103-7 [= Zaehner 1976:136] . Th e darkness is metaphorically described as so thick that one feels that one can grasp it with one's hands (AVN 18.4; Bd. 27.53; MX 6.31). Similarly, it feels as if one can cut the stench with a knife (Bd. 27.53).
Th is state of spatial oppression and sensory deprivation aff ects the perception of time. It seems to the souls that time passes much more 32) One Middle Persian catechism has a diff erent account of how sinners are transported down to hell. According to this text, known as Čīdag handarz ī pōryōtkēšān (Selected Advice of the Ancient Authorities), the demon of dismemberment casts an invisible rope around the neck of each person during the parents' sexual intercourse. One cannot remove that rope, but after death the rope falls from the neck of the righteous, whereas the demon uses that rope to drag the sinners into hell ( § § 31-32; see Kanga 1960:16, 25; Zaehner 1976:24) . 33) Th e darkness not only obscures light but even prevents the fi re from emitting its good smell (AVN 54.3); ZWY 3.23, 27; 7.35 speaks of "darkness and obscurity" (tār [ud] tom). 34) Th is feature corresponds to the primary metaphor "bad is stinky" (see Lakoff and Johnson 1999:50) . Th e "embodied mind" approach might provide explanations for many metaphors for hell.
slowly (AVN 18.7; 54.6) . Spatial oppression, sensory deprivation and all the suff ering and pain they endure in hell create for the souls a dominant perception of loneliness, which contrasts with the actual overcrowding of hell. Th e loneliness is "very bad" (Bd. 27.53). Th e souls cannot hear the cries of their fellow residents in hell, and all think that they are all alone . Hell is the most unsocial place imaginable.
Even in hell people need food. 35 However, as Manuščihr points out, the fetid, rotten, polluted, and unpleasant food served in hell is not eaten with delight, but out of sheer need (Dd. 31.6). Th e food of hell does not satiate and gives no satisfaction (Dd. 31.6-7). Th is is another example of the subtraction of all benefi cial aspects of ordinary activities in hell. It goes without saying that in heaven, eating is a pure pleasure and the best food imaginable is served. According to one text, Ahreman, the host of hell as it were, exhorts the demons not to treat the hell-dwellers well, but to "serve him (rather) with the fi lthiest and most foul food that Hell can produce." Accordingly, the demons serve him "poison and venom, snakes and scorpions and other noxious reptiles (that fl ourish) in Hell, and they serve him with these to eat" (MX 119-20 [= Zaehner 1976:138] ). In the normal order of things, these beings should be killed by the faithful and not under any circumstances be eaten. Hell is a place where the system of purity works in an inverted form. Th e theme of food links the Middle Persian accounts of hell with the Gāthās. It seems that this is because of the dominant social interactional pattern of hospitality, where food and the exchange of gifts play a major part.
Diff erent Sections of Hell
Just as there are several sections of heaven, some texts point out that hell consists of several parts. According to one account, the soul of the deceitful person takes four steps, the fourth of which leads to hell itself 35) From a cognitive point of view, this is an example of Jesse Bering's experimentally tested observation that "those states with which people conceptually should have the most diffi culty imagining the complete absence of (i.e., epistemic, emotional, and desire states) are attributed to dead agents much more readily than are those states which are frequently absent from our everyday phenomenological reserve (i.e., psychobiological and perceptual states)" (Bering 2002:288) . Apart from cognitive constraints, only the continuation of basic phenomena of life makes hell rhetorically function as a mirror to evaluate the present. (AVN 17.20) or to the innermost hell, the dwelling-place of Ahreman and the demons (MX 1.116).
Manuščihr presents his readers with a diff erent infernography. According to his Religious Judgements, hell consists of three directions, or of "three places," which "together are called hell" (Dd. 32.6). Interestingly, he reckons the hamēstagān as one of them. Elsewhere the hamēstagān is defi ned as the place where the souls are placed of those who end up neither in paradise nor hell because they have an equal share of sins and merits (e.g. AVN 6.3; PhlRDd. 65.2). Manuščihr, however, divides the hamēstagān into two parts, one for the righteous, and one for the deceitful, the latter being the fi rst section of hell, which is dark and fetid and full of evil (Dd. 32.3). Th e second section of hell is the "worst existence" (wattom axwān), the abode of the demons, full of evil and torture (Dd. 32.4). Th e third section he calls druzaskān. Actually, the word is the Middle Persian form of an Avestan word which occurs once in the Vendidād, where the power of the divine agent Sraoša is praised, who is requested to strike a demon so that he will end up in the druǰas.kanā-(V. 19.41). Th at word, it seems, has never gained wider currency, but Manuščihr employs that textual heritage for his construction of a tripartite infernography. He qualifi es the druzaskān as "the bottom of the house of darkness, where the head of the demons runs" (Dd. 32.5). Our available sources do not permit us to decide whether this tripartite division was generally known, or whether it was merely an intellectual exercise by a learned theologian, articulated maybe in order to negotiate diff erent concepts of hell.
Be that as it may, another division of hell appears in the Ardā Virāz Nāmag (Th e Book of the Righteous Virāz). No less than 84 of the 101 chapters (according to the standard modern editions) of this text deal with hell; it is the most detailed description of the other world available in Zoroastrian literature. Given its textual history and various translations, it is also one of the most popular religious writings of the Zoroastrians. Th e work is impossible to date with any amount of accuracy. Th e text reports a controlled ritual experiment conducted under the supervision of priests. Diff erent versions of the text place the account in diff erent periods of the past (see Gheiby 2004) . As a result of this ritual experiment the soul of the righteous Wirāz leaves his body and proceeds to explore the other world in order to dispel the doubts about the effi cacy of the rituals with respect to the other world. Under the guidance of two spiritual beings (Srōš and Ādur or Srōš and Ardwahišt [see Gheiby 2004:95] ), Virāz sees the deities and the empty throne of Ahura Mazdā, before being shown around in heaven and hell. His fi rst entry to hell is from the Činwad bridge. Having made a fi rst tour through hell, Virāz is led back, and underneath the Činwad bridge, in the middle of a desert, he is shown the "hell in the earth" (AVN 53.1), from where he hears the complaints and cries from Ahreman, the demons, evil creatures, and the souls of the deceitful (AVN 53.2). So apparently there are two hells, and Virāz proceeds to visit the inner one as well. Th e general description of this inner hell is not really diff erent from the regular one. Apart from the attributes "dangerous" and fearful" (AVN 54.2), it shares the characteristics of the regular hell, including the loneliness of the suff erers who are not aware of the presence of the many others who, closely packed together, are as many as "a number of the hairs of the mane of a horse" (AWN 54.4 [= Vahman 1986:208] ).
Opinions vary on the interpretation of the duplication of hell. Michel Tardieu thinks that the distinction has been borrowed from Christian apocalyptic traditions, in particular the Apocalypse of Paul (Tardieu 1985: 22-23) , while others see it as a sign of inconsistency resulting from successive and disorganized adaptations (Gignoux 1984:16) , or as a result of a process of redaction (Gheiby 2004) . Claudia Leurini (2002:216) has argued that there is "some specifi c regularity" in the distinction between the two hells, but I fi nd her statistical analysis of the frequency and distribution of sins, sinners, and punishments not so compelling that chance distributions are ruled out suffi ciently. At this stage I tend to concur with the idea that the redactors have tried to accommodate the idea of a hell inside the earth, as contained in other sources, and to fi nd a place for it in their account. Besides looking for antecedents, one might also consider its communicative function: the distinction may well have served as a literary strategy to catch, or to sustain, attention, amidst the listing of all the sins and their correlating punishments.
Agents and Main Forms of Punishment
Hell is the dwelling-place of Ahreman, the demons, and the sinners. In the scenario of hell drawn by the Ardā Virāz Nāmag, the demons occasionally serve as assistants for eff ectuating the severe punishments that the sinners are undergoing. Th ey are pounding, beating, tearing and raking the souls of the sinners. Consonant with the Ahremanic ontology, the theologian Manuščihr remarks that the demons are made strong and powerful by the sins committed by the people; and they torment the sinners to the same extent that they have been empowered by them in the fi rst place (Dd. 31.5). Ultimately, it is only human sin that empowers hell. Especially on those who have committed mortal sins, Manuščihr states, the demons infl ict "pain and trouble and devouring and many kinds of stench, and biting and tearing and producing of all evil and discomfort" (Dd. 40.4 [= Jaafari-Dehaghi 1998:170-71] ).
Other agents of punishments beside the demons are beasts that devour people. In fact, this is the most common type of punishment. In most cases, however, the agents of punishment are not specifi ed. Th ey are simply referred to as "they."
As Leurini has calculated, the other most popular types of punishments are ingestion of impure materials, the cutting off of the tongue and hanging by the feet. Desperate weeping, moaning and crying are often mentioned (Leurini 2002:312) .
Even if hell appears as quite a gruesome place, the Zoroastrian texts emphasize that the principles of justice and right measure are safeguarded even in hell.
Hell is the place where the sinners -that is, those whose sins outnumber their virtues -will be placed after death. Th e reckoning of sins and virtues is done in such a way that justice is safeguarded. Justice also prevails in hell, for the divine agent Ašwahišt is allotted the task of supervising that the demons do not infl ict greater punishment on the sinners than is their due (Bd. 26.35) . Th e principle of divine justice and righteousness -embodied by Ašwahišt -prevails even in hell, the Ahremanic sphere par excellence, and the demons are prevented from acting in an arbitrary fashion. Even hell is encapsulated within the cosmic order -just as Ahreman's existence is encapsulated within the time frame set for the cosmic confl ict. Accordingly, the Bundahišn continues by saying that everybody will eventually reach paradise (Bd. 26.37).
Th e (Dis)order of Sins
Th e Ardā Wirāz Nāmag describes the suff ering infl icted for specifi c sins.
36 It is unclear whether the description implies that each person is punished for a single, main off ence committed, or whether one has to 36) Th ese are the sins, some of which are dealt with in more than one chapter (chapter numbers in parenthesis; + refers to cases where the sinner is gendered as male, * refers to cases where the sinner is gendered as female, indicating prevailing gender roles and stereotypes): +sodomy (19); *approaching water and fi re during menstruation (20); +homicide (21); +sexual intercourse during menstruation (22); +eating without ritual precautions (23); *adultery (24); walking with one shoe only (25); *disrespect of husband (26); +cheating with measures in commercial transactions (27); +bad rule (28); +slander and instigating confl ict (29); +illegal (= unritualized) slaughter of animals (30); +amassing and retaining wealth (31); +laziness/idleness (32) (in this chapter, the sinner is not presented anonymously, but the text refers to "Davāns who . . . never performed a good deed, but with his right food he threw a bundle of grass in front of a ploughing ox" [Vahman 1986:205] ); +lying (33); *throwing hairs into fi re while combing (34); *sorcery (35); +heresy (36); neglecting water and fi re (37); +polluting water and fi re through excrement and carrion (38); +withholding wages (39); +speak-ing falsehoods (40); +polluting public bathhouses (41); +fathers denying their legitimate off spring (42); +fathers denying their off spring (43); *abortion (44); +false testimony and extortion (45); +acquisition of wealth by stealing the property of others (46); heretics (47); +maltreatment of dogs (48); +false measurement of land (49); +removal of boundary stones (50); +making false promises (51); +violation of contracts (52); extinguishing sacred fi res, destroying bridges, and other sins (55); rejection of gods and religion (56); *keen (57); +washing in (and thereby polluting) lakes or springs (58); *neglecting crying and hungry children (59); +adultery (60); religious doubt [including doubting the evil of hell!] (61); *despising one's husband (62); *quarrelling with and backtalk to one's husband (63); *adultery and subsequent abortion (64); disrespect for one's parents (65); slander (66); +misbehaviour of a governor (67); *adultery (69); *abandoning one's husband (70); +sodomy and adultery (71); *neglecting menstrual restrictions (72); *using cosmetics and hair of others (73); illegal (= unritualized) slaughter of animals (74); not giving water to farm animals (75); *preparing and serving food during menstruation (76); overburdening of cattle (77); *denial of pregnancy and abortion (78); +taking bribes and false justice (79), selling items with false measures and weights (80); *prostitution and sorcery (81); *tartness with regard to the husband (82); *concealing of meat from husband (83); *poisoning of men (84); *adultery (85); *violation of next-of-kin-marriage (86); *not giving milk to one's child (87); *adultery (88); lack of benevolence (89); lying (90); +false judgements (91); envy and retaining benefi ts (92); denying hospitality to travellers (93); *not nursing and thereby killing one's child and selling one's milk to other (94); *leaving one's baby hungry and thirsty and adultery (95); +not sowing the earth (96); lying (97); undergo successively all the various forms of punishments corresponding to each and every sin committed. Th e text is obviously not interested in such theological intricacies, but rather wants to make an impression and inspire fear. Th e punishments suff ered by the damned are often physically linked to the kind of sin they have committed.
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Th is entails an anthropomorphization of the shape of the soul (i.e. the soul has a body).
38 Th e soul of the liar, for example, is punished with having worms gnaw its tongue (AVN 33), and the soul of a woman who has not paid respect to the menstrual taboos is forced to swallow bowls of fi lth and excrement (AVN 20) . 39 In communicative and rhetorical terms this helps readers (or listeners) to imagine the expected punishments when refl ecting on their own past and future actions.
Already the earliest editors and translators of the text were puzzled by the apparent disorder of the sins as they are depicted.
Regarding the arrangement of the crimes and off ences mentioned, there is nowhere any system, or plan, perceptible. All are thrown together, the most heinous crimes may be followed by trifl ing off ences. Several crimes and off ences are mentioned more than once, for instance adultery . . . infanticide . . ., nursing other children . . .; but each time the wording is diff erent as well as the punishment. (Haug and West 1971[1872] :lxix) eating corpses and killing beavers (98); disobedience to rulers and hostility to army (99). 37) Tardieu (1985:23-24) regards this strategy as a legacy of Greek traditions. 38) According to Zoroastrian Pahlavi texts, man is composed of various mental (spiritual/conceptual) faculties, among them the soul (ruwān). Th e death of a person entails that the soul (together with other mental faculties) is separated from the body (tan). Being a mental faculty, the soul is linked to a body (and the separation from it causes terror to the soul), but the soul as such does not have a bodily shape. In the narrative (as told by the Ardā Wirāz Nāmag) about the pain infl icted upon the souls by the demons, however, the souls are presented in bodily shape, and the pains can only be eff ectuated on the bodies of the soul. In cognitive approaches to the study of religions, these inconsistent ways of defi ning/imagining the ontology and actions of agents is referred to as theological incorrectness (see Barrett 1999; Slone 2004) . 39) Th e Dēnkard witnesses another strategy, when it states that the contract-breakers are assigned to "the bottom of hell" (Dk. IX 20) , where the souls are not punished physically but are placed in a particularly uncomfortable section of hell. (Reference kindly provided by Yuhan Vevaina.)
Haug and West are content with stating these facts, without attempting an explanation. Th e Iranian independent scholar Bijan Gheiby has recently come up with an ingenious explanation for the apparent chaos. He fi nds that "any attempt at introducing order and arrangement into hell seems superfl uous" because Ahreman's creation is defi ned as fundamentally chaotic, "not planned or methodically constructed " (2004:96) . Unfortunately, however, this principle is never mentioned in the list of common attributes of hell. It also is in contradiction with the limits set by Ašwahišt on the punishments infl icted by the demons, implying, as pointed out above, that even hell is ultimately under divine control. Rather than chaos, hell appears as a perverse order. Gheiby's idea therefore remains somewhat speculative.
Th ere may be other reasons (no less speculative, to be sure). To begin with, the reduplications may well have to do with the long redaction history of the text. Obviously, this hypothesis does not dissolve the question of inconsistency, but merely moves it up one level, as it were. Not the authors, but the redactors and editors were then to be blamed for the apparent disorder.
One may also wonder whether the description is unsystematic not because of the nature of hell, but because of the nature of communication and memory. If it were to proceed systematically, would the text then not lose elements of surprise, of criss-crossing expectations, of unexpected turns that help to sustain attention? It must be kept in mind that this book was apparently meant for popular consumption and not written to satisfy the needs of theologians.
Moreover, one may ask whether an arrangement that proceeded, say, from the most heinous sins to the most trifl ing (or vice versa), or which classifi ed sins according to social relationships and ontological categories (sins towards relatives, business partners, men, nature, etc.), would correspond to the world of experience, where one has the opportunity to commit sins of various degrees all the time.
Last but not least, it was possibly the intention of the text to show that one has to pay attention to sins of all kinds and to encourage the formation of what one might call a total ethical habitus. Th e text may well witness a mentality that does not at all share the idea that one can disregard minor off ences. Conquering Ahreman will not be possible unless each and every little sin is avoided.
Hell in Miniatures
Th e Ardā Wirāz Nāmag was probably the most successful Pahlavi book in terms of literary diff usion (witness the various translations of the work). Apart from textual transmission, the work was also translated into visual culture. In Mogul India, miniatures were painted that illustrated Persian or Gujarati translations of the Ardā Wirāz Nāmag.
40 Th e scenes of hell were of course easy to visualize for the artists. In this way, the text also reached illiterate people. Dhanjibhai Nauroji, the fi rst modern Zoroastrian convert to Christianity, who would later himself become a Christian missionary, tells the following episode in his autobiography From Zoroaster to Christ:
I saw a Parsi lady of my acquaintance reading a book, and asked her what it was she was reading. She told me it was Ardawirafnama. . . . It has several pictures, and the lady showed me one of them. A frightful one it was! A man was hanging in a tree, with his legs tied together, his feet upwards, and his head downwards. Serpents and scorpions were all over his body, and devils with tails were all around. I asked the lady what it meant, and she said it was a picture of the punishment which a man was receiving in hell, who had been a great sinner while on earth. I fl ed from her and became violently agitated in mind. Why had I been allowed to see that picture? (Nauroji 1909:24-25) Th is report is part of a biographical reconstruction explaining his increasing dissatisfaction with Zoroastrianism in his youth -a typical feature of conversion narratives. As such, the episode is part of a narrative scheme that contrasts the barbaric character of his former religion with the paternal benevolence of his adopted one. Nevertheless, the episode vividly illustrates the power of these sorts of pictures in making a lasting emotional impression on memory. As such, these miniatures may have fulfi lled an important function.
III. Th e Erosion of Hell in Contemporary Zoroastrianism?
Th e quote from Dhanjibhai Nauroji has brought us to the modern age. on the development of Zoroastrian conceptualizations of hell in Persian and Gujarati Zoroastrian literatures. Instead, we will now make a long jump of another millennium (from the date of the literary composition of most Pahlavi works) and conclude this article with some comments on the present age.
Some ten years ago, Philip Kreyenbroek conducted a study among the Zoroastrian (Parsi) community in India based on thirty in-depthinterviews of urban Zoroastrians from Mumbai belonging to diff erent social milieus and religious groups (but overwhelmingly lay-people). One of his results was that compared to classical texts, hell had apparently ceased to preoccupy the minds of people: "none of our informants indicated that they were afraid of going to hell" (Kreyenbroek 2001:299) . He links this fi nding to a general attitude averse to dualistic thinking, which is openly rejected by some.
From my reading of contemporary Zoroastrian theological literature, I am under the impression that hell is not a prominent topic in the contemporary literature written by Zoroastrians on their religion, although many duly mention it as part of their theological legacy. However, some modern theologians such as Dastur Bode or the neo-Zarathushtrian "convert" Ali Akbar Jafarey exhibit the tendency to interpret heaven and hell as subjective states rather than as objective places or as inner-worldly rather than as otherworldly domains (see Stausberg 2002b:139, 369 ).
Besides such qualitative data, John Hinnells has provided us with quantitative data from a survey conducted in Britain, Hong Kong, North America (USA and Canada), Australia, and Kenya in the period [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] . Th e total numbers for belief in "heaven and hell" (thus not specifi cally hell!) varies from 31% (Canada) to 77% (Kenya). With the exception of Hong Kong (33%) and Sydney (38%) on the one extreme and Karachi (71%) 41 on the other, most countries and cities were in the 45 to 54% range. Th e fi gures for "heaven and hell" are consistently and signifi cantly lower than the fi gures for "belief in immortality of soul"; at the same time they score consistently higher than the fi gures for both "reincarnation" and "resurrection" (see Hinnells 1994:99) . Due to the lack of previous documentation it is impossible to decide whether these 41) Hinnells (1994:66) advises that " [t] he fi gures for Karachi should be treated with caution," since the questionnaire was part of a pilot study. fi gures amount to evidence for continuity or decline of beliefs in hell, but the fi gures are certainly higher than one would have expected based on Kreyenbroek's statement (unless one believes in either a radical decline in the decade separating Hinnells' from Kreyenbroek's study or in India being totally exceptional with regard to the spread of these beliefs).
Th e survey data provided by Hinnells allow for some further comments. 42 Th us, there are clear distinctions when one takes the countries of origin of the diaspora-Zoroastrians into account: only 30% of those already settled in the West and only 36% of those from an Iranian background affi rmed a belief in heaven and hell, whereas the scores for people originating from India (48%), Pakistan (66%), and East Africa (54%) were much higher. Among those coming from India, significantly more Zoroastrians from Gujarat (60%) asserted belief in heaven and hell than people from Mumbai (46%). 43 Signifi cantly more people married to Zoroastrians affi rmed the belief (50%) than those married to non-Zoroastrians (41%).
In general, a higher number of those who had attended religious classes in childhood expressed such a belief (52%) than of those who had not (45%). Th ese fi gures may mirror the eff ects of religious education, or co-vary with other factors. A higher number of those who read Zoroastrian (religious) literature (52%) expressed belief in heaven and hell than of those who did not read Zoroastrian literature (45%). A signifi cant higher number of those who regularly attended a Zoroastrian Centre (i.e. a community infrastructure in the diaspora) affi rmed this belief (52%) than of those who attended infrequently (33%). Higher education slightly correlated with lower scores (46% of those who had done postgraduate studies expressed this belief against 51% with lower degrees of education). Zoroastrians having a degree in sciences were less likely to affi rm this belief than those who had degree in the arts (45% as against 54%). More business people (49%) asserted this belief than professionals (42%).
Among age groups, the belief was least asserted by people in their 20s (40%), while those in their 60s (57%) scored highest, but these fi gures 42) For all the fi gures quoted in the following see Hinnells 2005:758-83. 43) Th ese fi gures also correlate to the fi gures for the languages in which people read: Persian (35%), English (43%), Gujarati (57%); see Hinnells 2005:763. should not be over-interpreted, given the scores for the adjoining age groups (under 20s: 46%; 70+: 49%). Types of families, however, did not yield signifi cant diff erences (nuclear: 45%; extended: 49%; no family: 49%), nor did having children correlate (with children: 48%; no children: 46%). Th e belief was more pronounced among those who were widowed (55%) and less among those who were separated or divorced (41%) than among either singles or married people (48% each). In general, slightly more females than males seemed to believe in heaven and hell (51% against 45%).
Th ese data show that the belief in heaven and hell is shared by around half of the worldwide Zoroastrian diaspora population, with some signifi cant diff erences. Th e belief is affi rmed particularly by women, people who have married Zoroastrians, business people, people with a degree in the arts, or relatively little education, by people from East Africa, Pakistan and India, especially from rural backgrounds, and by people who frequently visit a Zoroastrian Centre, read Zoroastrian literature and who attended religious classes in childhood. All these correlations say nothing about co-variation and causalities. To take just one example: does being married to a Zoroastrian make a person likely to hold this belief, or does one avoid marrying non-Zoroastrians because one is afraid of hell, or is this only a case of co-variation? Similarly: what is the causal signifi cance, if any, of professional, educational, and geographical background? Th e clear distribution by country, however, makes it likely that hell plays a diff erent role in the Zoroastrian discursive communities and world-views in diff erent countries.
Given that the diaspora (contrary to India and partly also to Iran) does not have a full-time professional priesthood, Hinnells' fi gures do not cover the priesthood (even if the dataset may include some Zoroastrians who were trained as priests) and his demographic variables do not include information on possible priestly backgrounds. Kreyenbroek's later study explicitly focused on the urban laity. Since the priests are the backbone of the normative tradition as propagated in the sources discussed above -in fact all the Middle Persian texts referred to above were probably composed by priests -we need to look at the attitudes of contemporary Zoroastrian priests.
In 2006 and 2007 the present writer (assisted by Dr. Ramiyar Karanjia, Benaifer Wykes, and Meher Patel) conducted a comprehensive survey of the contemporary Zoroastrian priesthood in Western India. 44 Th e main dataset of this survey were structured interviews with some 50 practicing full-time professional priests. As part of the interview we asked a series of questions on the priests' beliefs. One of the questions was whether they believed in heaven and hell. 42 priests answered this question, among whom 4 priests stated that they did not believe in heaven and hell. One of them (aged 51) said: "Everything is here only." Furthermore, one priest expressed an agnostic attitude, stating: "We fi nd out when we go there." Nine priests affi rmed their belief, but with the important qualifi cation that heaven and hell were considered thisworldly phenomena, 45 some making a connection to the concept of karma. One priest (76) 46 regarded heaven and hell as constructions of the mind ("it can make heaven of hell and hell of heaven"). One priest (57), who held a degree in Avesta and Pahlavi, pointed to the Ardā Wirāz Nāmag, which he described as an "allegorical" description of the other world, 47 while another priest, aged 63, referred to the bridge leading to the other world (from which the souls fall into hell) as "mythological." Th us, there are very few priests who explicitly reject a belief in heaven and hell, but there are several priests who add qualifying statements to a general affi rmation of this belief. Th e great majority of priests, however, either simply replied in the affi rmative or even asserted this belief in an emphatic manner.
48 Some also added brief statements. 49 And at least one priest (73) expressed the confi dence that 44) Th e priesthood in Iran has changed dramatically after World War II. Th e professional heritable full-time professional priesthood has in practice been abolished; see Stausberg 2004:110-13. 45) Here are some responses: "Everything is here"; "Whatever is there you suff er here only"; "Yes, it is there but it is in this world only"; "It exists on this world only"; "If you have misbehaved and done something bad, later on in your life, you or your kids will have to suff er"; ". . . at times I feel that we get rewarded for our good and bad deeds in this lifetime only. So we have heaven and hell here only. But there must be something that is why we have rituals and ceremonies." Th e latter statement refers to the fact that the priests primarily perform rituals. 46) Th e numbers in brackets refer to the age of the respondents. 47) Some other respondents also referred to this text. 48) "All of us go there"; Yes. I believe in it"; "I suppose so"; "I have heard about it so I believe in it": "Certainly"; "Yes, defi nitely"; "Obviously it is there"; "Sure." 49) "According to Ardaviraf-Nameh, when he leaves the earthly plane, to see what is there; heaven, hell and Hamestagan, where sin and good deeds are equal. When I am the correct performance of rituals would bring the priests (and their clients) to heaven ("If we perform the rituals properly, we go to heaven"). 50 It therefore seems that the hypothetical erosion of conceptions of hellif they ever were as wide-spread in the communities as the normative literature suggests -has so far not aff ected the priesthood, at least not in India, where those doubting the existence of hell are a minority.
